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The European Council discussed the issue of EU refugee quotas on 25-26 June, with several
countries divided over whether and how responsibility for refugees should be distributed across EU
member states. In light of the discussion, Hillel Rapoport outlines a three stage proposal for
implementing a Tradable Refugee-Admission Quota System (TRAQS) which encompasses tradable
quotas for refugees and a ‘matching mechanism’ that takes account of the preferences of migrants
and member states. He argues that this model could oﬀer a realistic framework for compromise that
would be both fair and cost-eﬀective.
The Green Group in the European Parliament took the initiative to organise on 3 June a public hearing entitled
Beyond Dublin: Rethinking Europe’s Asylum System. The hearing aimed at reassessing EU asylum policies in the
context of the current refugee crisis. The last session was dedicated to presenting a few “alternative proposals”,
including the Tradable Refugee-Admission Quota System (TRAQS) model that I have proposed alongside my co-
author Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga.
Our proposal builds on well-established models in public economics (markets for tradable quotas) and on recent
contributions in the ﬁeld of mechanism design, speciﬁcally the “matching” mechanism in what follows, which has
been successfully applied by Alvin Roth and his co-authors – and won the former the 2012 Nobel Prize in
Economics — to issues as diverse as the allocation of students to schools or hospitals as well as to kidney
transplants. We believe that with some adaptation, these tools can also be applied to improve the EU’s asylum and
refugee-admission policy in terms of both eﬃciency and equity.
A Tradable Refugee-Admission Quota System: Stage 1
To explain how the system could work, we use the metaphor of a 3-stage rocket. Stage 1 is similar to the
“distribution key” recently proposed by the Commission. Under that proposal, formulated on 30 May and to be
discussed at the European Council of 25-26 June, the distribution key seeks to achieve “fair” responsibility sharing
by taking into account the population size of a country (with a weight of 40 per cent), its GDP (40 per cent),
unemployment rate (10 per cent), and the number of spontaneous asylum applications and resettled refugees per
million inhabitants between 2010 and 2014 (10 per cent). The scheme will consist of a single European pledge of
20,000 resettlements (for Syrian refugees currently in refugee-camps in Syria’s neighbouring countries) and the
relocation of 40,000 asylum seekers currently in Greece and Italy to other EU countries.
This proposal is unlikely to be adopted for at least two reasons. First, the expected costs for receiving countries are
much higher than the 6,000 euros one-time compensation per refugee proposed by the Commission. How much
higher? This is impossible to know in the absence of a cost-revelation mechanism of the type we propose in our
Stage 2 below. Arguably, the direct costs of physically hosting refugees/asylum seekers are just a fraction of the full
economic costs, which include refugees’ immigration surplus and net ﬁscal contribution (which could be positive) as
well as the perceived social and political costs associated to their integration.
Second, these expected costs are highly uncertain because host countries have never faced a situation where they
have had to put a number on those costs (“how much I am willing to pay to avoid having to take-in one additional
refugee?”) and also because countries are uncertain about the type of refugees/asylum seekers they would receive.
And indeed, immediately after the European Commission proposed its New European Agenda for Migration, the
British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that the UK would opt out from the system, while the French
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Prime Minister Manuel Valls expressed strong
reservations, and the Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav
Sobotka went as far as to state that the system was
pure nonsense on the basis that refugees from the
Middle East and Africa don’t want to come to a cold
place such as the Czech Republic.
The deﬁnition of a distribution key allocating refugee-
admission quotas among Member States, therefore,
is a welcome but insuﬃcient move. We propose to
supplement it with two additional components.
Stage 2
Stage 2 consists in making the initial quotas deﬁned
in Stage 1 “tradable”. The advantage of a tradable
quota system is that it allows for the revealing of
information on the true costs of hosting refugees in
the participating countries, and it allows countries to
exploit their comparative advantages in either
“hosting” or “funding”. In other words, there are two ways through which countries can contribute to the public good
of the “international protection of refugees”: through visas, or through money. The market for admissions will
allocate refugees so that the marginal cost of hosting them is equalised across destinations. The solution is eﬃcient
in that it minimises the total cost (or, for a given total cost, allows for the accommodation of more refugees).
In practice, tradable quotas have only been used as a tool for environmental policy. However, a market for refugee
admission quotas would be more complex than a market for emissions quotas for two reasons. First, refugees are
heterogeneous in terms of education, age, family status, and other factors which can make them individually more
or less desirable from the viewpoint of receiving countries. Second and no less importantly, in contrast to pollution
particles, refugees have preferences over their locations. This creates room for further eﬃciency gains by taking into
account refugees’ and Member States’ preferences – hence the matching component below.
Stage 3
Stage 3 therefore, consists of a matching mechanism whereby each candidate refugee (e.g. an asylum seeker or a
refugee applying for resettlement within the EU) is asked to rank his or her preferred destinations. This means that
they would prefer to be resettled in that destination (or have their asylum request examined there) rather than
remaining in their current location. Candidate refugees are then ranked in a random order, with the ﬁrst in line
granted her ﬁrst choice, the second in line her ﬁrst choice (and so on) until we have to go down the list as preferred
destinations gradually ﬁll up.
This will contribute to improving refugees’ long-term integration prospects, thereby reducing the costs of hosting
them. At the same time, EU hosting countries also express their preferences, this time vis-à-vis the “type” of
refugees they would like to host. For example, countries can express preferences according to the skill or education
level of the refugees, their nationality, or family status. This is done by “bidding” for certain types as part of the
country’s quota. If all countries have the same preferences, the result will be equivalent to a case where they are
indiﬀerent with respect to refugee type. If countries have diverging preferences, then allowing them to express these
preferences will further reduce the expected cost of the system. Lowering the expected cost of the system as far as
possible is essential to enlarging the political coalition that will eventually support it.
Finally, it turns out that the addition of the matching mechanism to the market for TRAQs not only leaves its
eﬃciency properties intact (if properly designed) but also allows for designing a sanction mechanism that will insure
2/3
that refugees will be well treated at their destination – which is the main concern expressed by NGOs and advocacy
groups ﬁghting for refugees’ rights. If participating countries were compensated on the basis of the number of
refugees and asylum seekers they bid for in the market, they would have an incentive to bid for a large quota and
later on discourage refugees and asylum seekers from going there.
For example, under the current distribution key, Hungary should host 300 resettled refugees. Instead of opposing
the move, Hungary could be tempted to accept to take these 300 refugees and choose – God forbid! – to treat them
badly, or to intimidate them, eﬀectively discouraging them and future refugees from coming. With the sanction
mechanism we propose (possible only by combining the tradable quota system and the matching mechanism),
Hungary would have to pay the market price for the unﬁlled part of its quota, which would impose a higher cost than
the true cost for Hungary of hosting refugees, whatever that cost is. In other words, countries would be incentivised
to become attractive destinations for refugees, not unattractive ones. Or, to paraphrase Mr. Sobotka, the fact that
refugees don’t want to come to the Czech Republic, instead of being other Member States’ problem, would become
the Czech Republic’s problem – it would have an incentive to become a ‘warmer’ place.
Overall, the combination of these two elements – the tradable quotas system and the matching mechanism – results
in a policy tool that has lots of theoretical advantages: cost-eﬃciency, incentive compatibility (that is, it generates a
truthful revelation of preferences on both the migrants and countries’ sides), and fairness in responsibility sharing. It
should be given a fair chance.
This article is based on joint work with Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. See
the author’s forthcoming article in CESifo Economic Studies for a longer discussion of the topic.
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